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Water Institutional Reforms in Scotland:  
Contested Objectives and Hidden Disputes 
Antonio A. R. Ioris 
Abstract 
One fundamental limitation of the contemporary debate over water institutional reforms 
has been the excessive concentration on scientific assessments and management 
techniques, with insufficient consideration of the underlying politics of decision-making 
and socio-economic asymmetries. This article examines the 'sociology of water 
regulation' to demonstrate how the implementation of the European Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) in Scotland is profoundly influenced by broader political and economic 
circumstances. The ongoing reforms of regulatory institutions became entangled in the 
reorganisation of a devolved Scottish Administration in the late 1990s, which has directly 
influenced the channels of representation and the overall decision-making processes. It is 
claimed here that, despite a discursive construction around sustainability and public 
participation, the new institutional landscape has so far failed to improve long-term 
patterns of water use and conservation. The article also analyzes how the exacerbation of 
the economic dimension of water management has permeated the entire experience, 
serving as a political filter for the assessment of impacts and formulation of solutions. 
The ultimate conclusion is that formal changes in the legislation created a positive space 
for institutional reforms, but the effective improvement of water policy and catchment 
management has been curtailed by political inertia and the hidden balance of power. 
Keywords 
Water institutions, water institutional reforms, WFD, Scotland, devolution 
INTRODUCTION 
The approval of new regulations on water management, such as the WFD, represents the 
latest step in a sequence of international reforms that started in the 1970s and, since 
then, have attempted to replace traditional approaches – largely based on rigid 
regulatory controls – with more flexible, adaptive and comprehensive responses to water 
management problems. 1  Instead of single purpose, engineering-based initiatives, 
governments and society are now expected to systematically address socio-economic and 
cultural aspects of freshwater extraction, effluent discharge and river alteration. The 
transition from old to new regulatory approaches is not without tensions and 
inconsistencies, which this article will explore by examining some legal and operational 
aspects of the Scottish experience. According to those responsible for the reforms, the 
implementation of the WFD has prompted a far-reaching renovation of policies, use and 
control of water in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2006), because it is the first time that 
water use is comprehensively covered by a single piece of legislation.2 It is important to 
mention that the new legislation still operates in tandem with common law controls 
                                           
1  For the purpose of this analysis, ‘water regulation’ is defined as the formulation and 
implementation of legal requirements and government policies; ‘water management’ is the 
application of methods and techniques for the use and conservation of water and related ecology. 
2 Previous regulation was mainly focused on point source discharge (under the 1974 Control of 
Pollution Act and subsequent amendments), with hydropower, water supply and navigation also 
covered by ad hoc Acts of Parliament and Control Orders. 
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(Clark, 2006), in particular, because there was no change regarding the ultimate 
ownership of water in Scotland (Allan, 2003). 
Government agencies have praised the introduction of the WFD in Scotland – in 2003 – 
as a genuine opportunity to deal with the 'totality' of water environmental problems in a 
country that depends "socially, culturally and economically on the quality of our water 
environment". 3  Nonetheless, despite the historical importance of the ongoing water 
reforms, there are still scarce assessments of overall achievements and future trends of 
the Scottish experience as a result of the implementation of the WFD, with most authors 
remaining committed to the eulogistic tone of official documents and commissioned 
reports (e.g. Hanley and Black, 2006; Moran et al., 2007; or Morris and Morris, 2005). 
The consequence is a gap in the understanding of the effective possibilities and conflicts 
associated with the new regulatory regime in Scotland. There is, therefore, an authentic 
need for critical assessments at the national and sub-national level, all the more so 
because after the euphoria of the initial years before the WFD’s approval (when 
uncertainties about its objectives due to ambiguities, questionable enforceability, and 
high compliance costs were already apparent; cf. Kallis and Butler, 2001), its operational 
contradictions are now becoming increasingly apparent in many parts of Europe 
(Steyaert and Ollivier, 2007). 
The main objective of this article is to critically discuss the ongoing water reforms in 
Scotland, in view of relevant historical and sociological factors not generally included in 
more mainstream texts (such as the accounts recently provided by Futter et al., 2006; 
Hanley et al., 2006; and Ison and Watson, 2007). After a brief review of the institutional 
basis and conceptual shortcomings of the international experience on reforming water 
policy and management, three main areas of contention are analyzed. First, the issue of 
the increasing politicisation of water management associated with the introduction of 
more stringent regulatory objectives for water use and conservation. Water disputes in 
Scotland are uniquely associated with the redesigning of national administrative 
responsibilities and the reestablishment of a devolved parliament. Second, the article 
then critiques the selective involvement of stakeholders in the regulatory reforms, 
demonstrated by the ascendancy of some geographical areas or social groups over others 
less politically organized. Although public consultations and open meetings are meant to 
create democratic channels of communication between water stakeholders and decision-
makers, in practice the implementation of the WFD in Scotland remains highly centralized 
and bureaucratic. Third, the fundamental limitation of the ongoing reforms is the 
difficulty to achieve a satisfactory operationalisation of the innovative aspects of the WFD, 
particularly because of the exacerbation of the economic dimension of water use. Finally, 
the text will argue that the barriers to implementing and operationalising the goals of the 
WFD are not only due to the Directive’s complexity, but also reflect some limitations 
inherent in the water institutional reforms, and will suggest that more fundamental 
changes are required. 
THE SLIPPERY LANDSCAPE OF CONTEMPORARY WATER REFORMS 
The changes in water regulation currently taking place in many parts of the world are 
part of the emerging attempts to improve 'environmental governance' and remove 
unhelpful divisions between the state, market and local communities (cf. Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006). The new regime of governance embraces concepts such as integration, 
adaptation, and sustainability, which have broadened the list of criteria to be considered 
in the decision-making process. It has expanded the agenda of water regulation, 
requiring that projects and programmes should now include not only physical and 
                                           
3 Scottish Government. Protecting Scotland's Water Environment at 
www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/environment/water/17316/9088 (accessed on 10 December 2007). 
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biological criteria, but should also equally consider the social and economic dimensions of 
water use and conservation. The novel mechanisms of environmental governance 
essentially revolve around the establishment, reaffirmation, or change of 'social 
institutions' (Paavola, 2007). Institutions, which can be defined as systems of prevalent 
social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2006), are complex systems, 
whose reproduction is incomplete, provisional, and unstable and which co-evolve with a 
range of other complex emergent phenomena (Jessop, 2001). Water institutions – such 
as property rights and management accountability rules – are subjective, path dependent, 
hierarchical, and nested both structurally and spatially, and embedded within the cultural, 
social, economic and political context (Saleth and Dinar, 2005; see also Conca, 2006). 
This means that the institutional reforms associated with water governance cannot be 
seen in isolation, but are directly associated with larger agendas of state reconfiguration, 
socio-economic or political disputes, and dominant values that reflect prevailing power 
structures and are legitimized in and by institutions (Cumbers et al., 2003). This inherent 
politics of water governance unfolds through a series of interlinked geographical 
'domains’, from everyday matters and sovereign state policies to interstate and global 
politics (Mollinga, 2008). 
In spite of the contested nature of water governance and institutional reforms, most 
'mainstream' texts still depict water regulation as politically 'unproblematic' or, at least, 
with only a secondary political dimension (Blomquist and Schlager, 2005). If the 
expanding literature on water regulation – including the acronyms MSP (multi-
stakeholder platform), ICM (integrated catchment management) and IWRM (integrated 
water resources management), inter alia examined by Johnson et al. (1996), Warner 
(2005) and Conca (2006), respectively – has, to some extent, discussed the socionatural 
complexity of water problems, but most of the work under these concepts is restricted to 
empty exhortations for change in established practices and superficial adjustments in 
traditional approaches of water management. Where the contested nature of the reforms 
is acknowledged, it is still from a very managerial perspective, as if water politics were a 
kind of deviation from the purist purpose of water management (McCulloch and Ioris, 
2007). As a result, the political dimension of water governance and the disputes around 
institutional water reforms remain largely undertheorized (Mollinga and Bolding, 2004). 
Due to ideological, operational and funding constraints, a large part of the 'mainstream' 
academic work has been associated with policy formulation and implementation, while 
ignoring 'the political' and 'sociological' features of water resources management 
(Mollinga, 2008). For instance, it is still limited in the international literature, the number 
of scholars disposed to call into question the responsibility for past environmental 
impacts (e.g. Bakker, 2002), to discuss the accountability for expectations, decisions and 
actions (e.g. Blomquist and Schlager, 2005) or the willingness to relate the unsustainable 
use of water with the uneven distribution of opportunities across social groups (e.g. 
Loftus, 2006). Most efforts are spent on fanciful computer models and assessment 
techniques instead of also dealing with the politico-economic causes of environmental 
impacts or with social asymmetries that lead to unfair allocation and unsustainable use of 
water. It should be pointed out that the reluctance to recognize the 'hydropolitics' of 
water management institutions is not exclusive to Scotland, but permeates the 
regulatory agenda in many parts of the world (Sneddon and Fox, 2006). 
Most scholars miss the fact that the 'choreography' of the water reforms has primarily 
been influenced by conflicts of interest between governmental agencies and lobbying 
groups (as in the case of the WFD in Europe; cf. Kaika and Page, 2003). It is rare to find 
a critical assessment of the appropriation of common water resources by strong political 
and economic groups, at the expense of society at large (e.g. Swyngedouw, 2004). The 
mainstream version of water governance leaves little room for inquiring into distortions in 
the allocation and use of water, or for assessing the political game behind public funds 
(many times apportioned for the benefit of small private groups). The political 
shortcomings of the conceptualisation of the international water reforms are 
demonstrated by the failure to notice the biased mechanisms created for involving the 
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public in the decision-making process. In most countries, the public forums of debate 
have been contained by sectoral interests and the rigid timetable of government 
strategies. It is indeed difficult to identify cases around the globe where those groups 
that historically controlled water allocation and use are not in control again of the 
implementation of supposedly novel water institutions. The consequence is that calls for 
participatory management and social learning are bound to translate into innocuous 
approaches in the face of the uneven balance of power and policy inertia.  
The failure to address the 'sociology of water reforms' (or the 'political sociology of water 
resources management’; cf. Mollinga, 2008) has constituted a major barrier to the 
understanding of the limitations and possibilities of contemporary water governance. 
Because of the reluctance to engage with the underlying political disputes, interventions 
on hydrological systems tend to generate costs, benefits and risks that are distributed 
unevenly across spatial and temporal scales and across social groups (as pointed out by 
Molle, 2007). The fact that those social and spatial inequalities are seldom considered in 
the formulation and implementation of a new water regulation may be an indication of 
the geometries of power behind the ongoing institutional reforms. The main gap in most 
texts is to ignore that contemporary water reforms are profoundly connected, as an 
integral component, to the neoliberalisation of the economy advanced and championed 
by the state itself (Potter and Tilzey, 2007). Likewise, many aspects of the prevailing 
responses to environmental degradation, such as the fashionable theory of ecological 
modernisation, also serve as new paths to capital accumulation (other than the 
traditional exploitation of natural resources), in which the conservation of nature is used 
as the 'substrate' of commercial transactions (Smith, 2007). The realisation of the 
inescapable political dimension of institutional water reforms should, therefore, be the 
entrance point to understanding how differences between social groups and spatial areas 
have influenced governmental action and the accommodation of conflicting interests, 
without necessarily achieving the best solution in terms of environmental conservation 
and satisfaction of social demands. Moving from the generic to the specific, the 
discussion of the Scottish experience will illustrate the limitations and intricacies of 
contemporary water reforms. It will focus on the political dimension of the institutional 
water reforms, an issue that is still not sufficiently acknowledged in Scotland. 
'DEVOLUTION’, THE WFD AND THE POLITICISATION OF WATER 
In any country, the introduction of a new water regulation involves the identification of 
(old and new) management problems, the development of specific policies, and the 
prioritisation of responses, which all necessarily require some form of political negotiation 
and intersectoral compromise. For instance, the implementation of the WFD in Europe 
has been responsible for a growing politicisation of water regulation, associated with 
increasing controversy about the best way to accommodate conflicting interests 
regarding water allocation, use and conservation. Because of the significant costs 
involved in restoring the ecological condition of water bodies – what is even more 
complicated in the overdeveloped and highly populated parts of Europe - there was a 
lengthy negotiation between the state, market and civil society for the approval of the 
new Directive (Page and Kaika, 2003), which added to a prolonged bickering between the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, intermingled with the pressures of 
different interest groups and NGOs (Kaika and Page, 2003). 
In Scotland, this overall context of disputes and politicisation has been further fuelled by 
the reinstallation of a semi-autonomous parliament and executive government (a process 
normally called 'Devolution’) in 1999, which coincided with the late stages of preparation 
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and final approval of the WFD.4 After nearly three centuries of united history, since the 
Treaty of Union in 1707, a Scottish Administration now regained control over a range of 
public matters, including overseeing the implementation of the WFD in one-third of the 
British territory (i.e. the area of Scotland in the UK). The movement for Scottish self-
determination is not new and has evolved over the past decades in an interlocked 
process of identity definition and fierce struggle for economic recovery (Beveridge and 
Turnbull, 1997). In effect, Scotland had suffered more than other parts of the UK due to 
problems such as declining population, emigration, unemployment, and extensive foreign 
ownership of local businesses (Danson, 1999; Danson and Gilmore, 2000; Gripaios and 
Bishop, 2005; McCrone, 2001), issues that politicians have repeatedly used as compelling 
arguments in favour of home rule (i.e. Devolution).5 In this context, questions related to 
water management are only some among many areas where Devolution still remains an 
incomplete process (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005; Keating, 2002, 2005), fraught with 
overlaps and uncertainties. For instance, in the case of energy generation (such as 
hydropower that accounts for 10% of Scottish electricity), public policies on energy are 
still a prerogative of London but the authorisation to build new schemes (under the 
planning permission regime) are decided in Edinburgh or by local authorities. 
The water institutional reforms in Scotland have become intertwined with the 
reaffirmation of the 'Scottish myth' (cf. McCrone, 2001) at times, which is one of the 
ideological pillars of the movement for political Devolution. According to the 'myth', there 
is an inherent egalitarianism among the Scots and the nation is "portrayed as a more 
egalitarian country (than England, at least) in which people relate to each other on the 
basis of merit rather than status", reflected in the verse "A man’s a man for a' that" by 
Robert Burns, which was chosen, significantly, to be sung at the official opening of the 
Scottish Parliament in July 1999 (McCrone, 2001). Such claims are in direct contradiction 
with a highly unequal society that has failed to ensure minimal levels of a decent life to 
all its members (e.g. one child out of three lives in poverty; cf. Dunion and Scandrett, 
2003) and has suffered from long-standing schisms (e.g. splits between Highlands and 
Lowlands, west and east, urban and rural, Protestants and Catholics, which all conspire 
to dissipate the Scottish national identity; cf. McCrone, 2001). These broader social 
divisions have - directly and indirectly - affected the course of the ongoing water reforms, 
which is demonstrated by the fact that influential groups of water users (see concrete 
examples from hydropower and water supply in the next section, Public Participation and 
Public Perception) and stronger economic regions (in particular, the wealthier 
neighbourhoods and more industrialized areas in the Central Belt, in the southeast and 
on the east coast that constitute the priority location for investments in pollution 
reduction and river restoration) have been able to exert sustained pressures in decisive 
moments of implementation of the WFD. 
It is worth observing that the historical coincidence between the WFD and the reinvention 
of the Scottish Administration facilitated the convergence of water regulatory reforms 
with the broader reorganisation of public affairs. There are significant historical parallels 
between political Devolution and institutional water reforms. Devolution and the WFD are 
                                           
4Political ‘Devolution’ is effectively a compromise between centralisation and independence, which 
produced a plurinational political arrangement that is neither a federation (i.e. there is no English 
parliament), nor a unitary system (some parts of the country now benefit from devolved powers). 
For some authors (e.g. Paterson, 1994: 181), the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 created an 
early ‘bureaucratic form of national government’ because it already provided Scotland with a semi-
autonomous administration.  
5 Likewise, politicians frequently try to associate Devolution with the Scottish Enlightenment, a 
period in the 18th century when Scotland shined as a centre of intellectual excellence: for example, 
a previous First Minister described political Devolution as “the ‘front line’ of radical constitutional 
change taking place in the UK” which will (allegedly) allow Scotland to regain its former glory of the 
European Enlightenment (cf. Scottish Executive News Release, 1998). 
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obviously independent but also clearly associated processes, what is normally described 
by critical realists as a 'contingent interaction' of specific causal chains in a certain 
context. To be sure, the reorganisation of environmental governance in Scotland was 
initiated a few years before Devolution with the approval of the Environment Act in 1995, 
which amalgamated various River Purification Boards under the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency (SEPA). The creation of SEPA was already a response to the changing 
landscape of environmental regulation in Europe that came to require a more proactive 
role from public organisations. Administrative reforms in the water sector included the 
consolidation of the water industry into a single public utility (Scottish Water) in 2002, in 
which the same principles of administrative rationalisation and cost reduction used to 
justify the creation of SEPA were invoked. At the same time as the public sector was 
being transformed, Scottish representatives were heavily involved in the negotiation of 
the new Water Directive, in particular, because the last chairman of SEPA (Sir Ken Collins; 
in office between 1999 and 2007), then a Scottish Member of the European Parliament, 
was in charge of the Environment Committee of the European Parliament and strongly 
supported the consolidation of European legislation into a single, comprehensive directive 
(Jordan, 2000). 
The transition from a previously centralized UK Government to a 'devolved' Scottish 
Administration has indeed had important material and symbolic consequences for dealing 
with water problems in Scotland. Before Devolution, it was significantly more difficult to 
reform Scottish law due to a shortage of parliamentarians’ time (in Westminster) and the 
restricted importance of Scotland issues in the UK political arena. This changed after 
1999, when the new Scottish Parliament was able to mobilize time and resources for a 
comprehensive review of the water legislation. More than merely a historical coincidence, 
the fact that Scotland was the first region in Europe to translate the WFD into national 
legislation (sanctioned under the Water Environment and Water Services Act in 2003, 
ahead of the official deadline; cf. Allan, 2003) reveals the political importance given to 
the water institutional reforms. In a short period of time (between 2005 and 2006), more 
than 7000 water use authorisations were issued by SEPA, ranging from simple to 
complex registrations, and multi-site licences. As claimed by the Scottish Government 
(2008: 06), "Scotland is at the forefront of influencing European policy on implementing 
the WFD, playing an important role in a range of working groups established by the 
European Commission". 
Crucially, the new parliament not only managed to produce a thorough legal reform that 
in some aspects goes beyond the requirements of the WFD (such as conservation 
objectives of coastal waters up to three nautical miles and the introduction of specific 
requirements to identify and monitor pressures and impacts in wetlands), but it also 
benefited institutionally from the political significance of having to translate the WFD into 
national legislation. In other words, the priority given to the WFD by the Scottish 
Parliament was not only a chance to improve water legislation, but also contributed to 
the very affirmation of the newly 'devolved' parliament. In fact, the early approval of the 
WFD was praised as a demonstration that Scotland can do things 'faster and better' (i.e. 
than the rest of the UK). Similarly, it has been repeatedly affirmed that, unlike in England, 
the "implementation of the WFD in Scotland has been both timeous and systematic" and, 
because of that, "Scotland has been at the forefront of the European process" (Hendry, 
2006). 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
In articulating a sense of national pride around the forthcoming water legislation, the 
young Scottish Administration systematically attempted to ascertain its authority by 
forging a range of channels with the main water user sectors. Nonetheless, while the 
involvement of some groups of stakeholders played an important role in shaping the new 
legislation, it did not necessarily result in stronger democratic representation or better 
environmental governance. On the contrary, lobbying and bargaining around the 
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adoption of the WFD have exposed a highly controlled process of public involvement and 
stakeholder contribution. Ison and Watson (2007) show how the approval of the new law 
was basically the product of a handful of officers from the Scottish Government and 
parliamentarian advisers, who worked closely with three representatives of NGOs (known 
at that time as the 'three witches’), with wider consultations coming only later in the 
process and, crucially, when most decisions had already been made. The selective basis 
of participation continued throughout the implementation of the WFD in Scotland, 
especially because the main institutional mechanism for involving the public has been the 
public consultation. The obvious weakness of consulting the public via formal 
consultations is that official agencies have ample discretion to accept or reject any 
suggestion received through the process. 
Since the early years of the new legislation, there has been a persistent difficulty to 
genuinely consider the inputs of stakeholders and local demands. For example, the 
design of the River Basin Districts, which are the administrative units of the new 
regulation, involved a series of meetings in different parts of Scotland in 2003. 
Nonetheless, while the public seemed to favour a format of River Basin Districts that 
coincided with catchment boundaries, decision-makers preferred to group totally 
unrelated catchments under the same district area. At that point most of the public also 
insisted, to no avail, on a more flexible and realistic timetable to implement the new 
Directive, which would have enabled more time for raising awareness and debating water 
problems. With extra time available, a number of local initiatives, such as catchment and 
stakeholder mobilisation schemes that existed throughout Scotland, could have better 
informed the preparation of the coming regulation. Likewise, some significant 
experiences in terms of water use and conflict resolution, such as with irrigators in the 
West Peffer Burn catchment, close to Edinburgh, or the Loch Leven water system, in 
operation since the 14th century in the Fyfe area, were largely neglected in the design of 
the new regulatory framework. Accordingly, staff at the SEPA offices complains that the 
implementation of the new regime has been too centralized by the agency headquarters, 
which has given them little room to adjust the regulation to the local context. 
In addition to public consultations and some ad hoc seminars, which happened especially 
between 2002 and 2005, the other opportunities for involving the public in the debate 
have been related to the preparation of the River Basin Management Plans (the strategic 
decision-making process introduced by the WFD). The Plans are being discussed 
regionally by 10 Area Advisory Groups (AAG), which are the official forums of public 
debate and sectoral negotiation. Despite their democratic appearance, the activities of 
the AAGs include a series of meetings with a rigid timetable and little flexibility for 
unexpected, time-consuming controversies. AAG representativeness is further weakened 
by the fact that its membership is decided unilaterally by SEPA, and the role of its 
members has been informative rather than operational. In other words, the scope of 
AAGs in Scotland is basically restricted to fine-tuning the production of the River Basin 
Management Plans (RBMP), instead of really engaging with the decision-making process.6 
Our discussions with members of the AAG and analysis of the documentation, revealed 
increasing complaints that the RBMP experience in Scotland is, by and large, a 'tick on 
the box' exercise of the official agenda of the implementation of the WFD. There is clear 
frustration at the lack of willingness on the part of SEPA to share data and discuss 
internal technical procedures. For example, it is not entirely clear how the agency is 
assessing the individual and cumulative impact on the environment caused by different 
water users in the same area. Consequently, there is limited prospect for members of the 
AAG to influence how SEPA will deal with the mitigation of water management problems. 
Equally, it is also difficult to perceive a strategic thinking behind the preparation of the 
                                           
6 This is clearly stated in, for example, “River Basin Management Planning North East Scotland Area 
Advisory Group (AAG)”. Meeting 27th June 2006, Aberdeen, at 
www.sepa.org.uk/pdf/wfd/rbmp/aag/ne/27jun06/minutes.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2007). 
Water Alternatives   
RBMPs, given that the focus has normally been on problems at the water body level and 
rarely at the catchment scale. 
Although SEPA officers personally recognize the importance of forming partnerships with 
stakeholders, the instrumentalisation of such partnerships (Sherlock et al., 2004) has 
been conducive to the reproduction of an essentially technocratic form of public 
involvement. So far, the bureaucratized involvement of the public has created only 
limited opportunities for social learning or for the creative contribution from water 
stakeholders. Ison and Watson (2007) warn that those responsible for environmental 
policies in Britain have suffered from an inability to handle a 'system to manage 
sustainable development’, focusing too much on water problems or 'WFD problems' and 
not enough on the broader and integrated scale of solutions. The inadequacy of 
conventional public participation approaches is also common in other parts of Europe, 
where decentralisation has been manipulated according to political interests without 
really moving European citizens much 'closer' to environmental regulation (Jordan, 2000). 
Nonetheless, it should also be acknowledged that the establishment of sound and 
democratic water governance constitutes a major challenge, in particular, because it 
requires solutions based upon information that is highly dispersed throughout society and 
held by groups with uneven political power. This further highlights the need to involve all 
interested parties, despite the difficulty to progress from public participation to an 
effective delegation of water management decision-making (cf. McCulloch, 2006). 
It is crucial to realize that the very characterisation of problems and solutions, in 
Scotland as it is elsewhere, is always a highly contested issue. Once the new legislation 
was approved in 2003, a series of studies indicated that 28% of water bodies in the main 
area of Scotland (the Scotland River Basin District) were threatened by sources of 
pollution (specially due to collection and treatment of sewage, aquaculture, 
manufacturing, refuse disposal, and mining and quarrying), 27% by water abstraction or 
dams (due to electricity generation, public water supplies and agriculture) and 34% by 
morphological interventions (due to historical engineering, agriculture, electricity 
generation, urban development and land claim). This gives a total of 43% of water 
bodies at risk of not achieving the objectives of the Directive by 2015 (SEPA, 2005a; see 
also SEPA, 2007). In the cross boundary district between Scotland and England (Solway 
and Tweed River Basin District), the situation is even worse: 56% of water bodies are at 
risk (SEPA and EA, 2005; see also SEPA and EA, 2007). 7 The sombre tone of these 
official reports – which are still mostly based on the compilation of previous monitoring 
priorities or desk studies rather than on fieldwork assessments - is in striking 
disagreement with the general public’s perception about the status of their local 
environment, a popular view that has been consistently identified in recent opinion 
surveys (e.g. Dalrymple, 2006; Martin, 2006; Scottish Executive, 2002). Despite 
conceding the existence of localized threats, the majority of the population insisted that 
Scotland has "good water quality and water quantity" (Murray and Myant, 2006). This 
apparent paradox between public perception and the technical assessments only makes 
the implementation of the new regulation more difficult, particularly in the face of the 
hierarchical and formalist nature of the dialogue between regulators and society. In any 
case, the alarming figures about the 'precarious' status of water in Scotland are probably 
serving to politically strengthen the implementation of the WFD, insofar as it reduces 
opposition and forces ‘consensus’ around regulatory targets. 
At the same time that a significant effort is spent on trying to conform to the European 
legal requisites, water management problems continue to emerge in various parts of 
Scotland. For instance, in the Loch Tay area, in the southern Highlands, there is growing 
                                           
7 It should be noted that, using similar assessment methodologies, in the rest of Europe the figures 
can reach 80% of water bodies, which indicates that the legitimacy of the WFD is largely based on 
the portrayal of a widespread precarious condition of water bodies. 
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competition between hydropower developers, local water supply operation, and 
environmental conservation objectives. This conflict has been recurrent in various 
applications to build new hydropower schemes in the Perthshire area, where the 
uncertainties related to the implementation of the new regulatory regime, together with 
the inconsistencies between planning development and water regulation, have created 
uneasiness among local and national stakeholder groups. Given the current policy of the 
Scottish Government in favour of small and medium size hydropower schemes, this kind 
of dispute is likely to increase. Similar contentions exist between sites affected by the 
construction of new dams (especially for urban water supply and hydropower) and the 
remote areas expected to benefit from additional electricity and public water supply. It is 
worth mentioning the existence of an intricate network of pipelines in the Highlands of 
Scotland that serve to transfer water from one catchment to the other. Decisions on the 
management of these multi-site schemes only add a new layer of complexity to an 
already complicated regulatory regime. Likewise, in the catchments shared between 
Scotland and England, water management has become entangled in a not always easy 
communication between public agencies to the north and south of the English border. 
The sub-national experience of the WFD in Scotland can be compared here with other 
devolved administrations in Europe, such as in the Lower Saxony, where the 
implementation of the new Directive has depended on a series of contextual and 
contingent inter-regional issues within the nation-state (Kastens and Newig, 2007).  
So far, the influence of the stronger players on the implementation of the WFD in 
Scotland has clearly thwarted the more innovative prospects of the new regulatory 
regime, such as the modification of the overall pattern of wasteful water use by 
households and business sectors. The largest water users - above all, hydropower and 
public water companies – have constantly exerted their political leverage to shape public 
policy in order to maintain business interests and ensure that everything unchanged. The 
liability for environmental damages, such as in the case of whisky distilleries that 
diverted entire streams to serve their water needs, is systematically denied with the 
claim that economic results are more important than trying to restore river systems. The 
stronger sectors have even managed to secure an exclusive agenda of discussions with 
the regulatory agency (for example, operational adjustments coordinated between SEPA 
and Scottish Water called 'Quality and Standards III’), which has not always been 
sufficiently transparent to the other concerning parties. Although the WFD, just as 
political Devolution, is promoted as heralding 'new politics' of democratic recovery via a 
more open approach to public matters, the actual practices of governing the environment 
continue to owe more to traditional rationalities of centralized managerialism (cf. 
Thompson, 2006; see also Dunion, 2003). A clear manifestation of such rationalities is 
the exacerbated role played by environmental economics in the implementation of the 
WFD in Scotland, as examined in the next section, Exacerbation of the Economic 
Dimension of Water Use. 
EXACERBATION OF THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF WATER USE 
One of the key policy instruments of the WFD regime is the requirement of all water 
users to make a payment equivalent to the environmental impact they create (normally 
described as the 'polluter-pays' or 'user-pays' principle; cf. Morris, 2007). The 
compensation for the negative impacts on the environment takes the form of 'bulk water 
charges' to be paid regularly to the regulatory agency (SEPA, in the case of Scotland). 
According to the literature on environmental economics that underpins most of the new 
institutional arrangement, bulk charges serve to internalize the social costs (i.e. negative 
externalities) of using the environment for private benefits (Morris, 2007), thereby 
introducing an economic rationality that stimulates the efficient and sustainable use of 
water (Dellapenna, 2000). In Scotland, the income from the new charges was expected 
to cover 50% of the operational costs incurred by SEPA, while the other 50% was to 
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come from the government in the form of general taxation (SEPA, 2005b).8 Charges are 
allocated according to a set of criteria that estimate the risk posed by the water user to 
the environment (following the spirit of the 'polluter/user-pays principle’, in the sense 
that activities with more impact should incur higher charges). The introduction of the 
WFD charges was the object of two specific public consultations carried out by the 
Scottish Government in the year 2005. The first dealt with charges to be applied during 
the initial phase of issuing the WFD licences (described as the 'transition period' of 
2005/2006) and only received 17 responses (basically, green NGOs, such as the World 
Wide Fund for Nature and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds), were in favour of 
expanding water use charges, while the main user sectors were against or expressed 
their apprehension about the new charging mechanism). The second consultation in 2005 
dealt with the full-charging scheme (i.e. to be in place after the transition period) and 
attracted 189 responses.9 The second consultation took place simultaneously with the 
beginning of applications for the new WFD authorisations, which only added animosity to 
an already contested process. 
To understand the meaning of bulk water charges in the Scottish experience, it is 
important to consider that instead of facilitating the implementation of water reforms the 
principle of cost recovery has entangled SEPA in a hostile environment of lobbying and 
public disapproval that corresponded to the most turbulent period of the WFD regime to 
date. An illustration of the widespread controversy associated with the introduction of the 
WFD charges in Scotland is provided in Table 1. SEPA was seen, particularly in the mass 
media, as a draconian agency that was trying to 'sell' the new regulation to secure its 
financial survival. This opinion was frequently repeated by individual stakeholders, 
especially those who were required to apply for a WFD authorisation to maintain current 
uses of water. Under serious criticism, SEPA had to quickly respond via a number of 
unscheduled meetings and ad hoc negotiations with water user sectors. The hurried 
amendments to the abstraction charges, during and after the consultation, "demonstrate 
the value of lobbying" and also the "concern that abstraction charges have caused among 
farmers and large users" (Hendry, 2006). 10  SEPA actually had to make several 
concessions during the development of the charging scheme, which will probably come to 
haunt the agency in the future. For example, the agency was forced to include several 
technical indices in the calculation of charges, which can now be challenged by the user 
sectors; likewise, the 'elastic' definition of abstraction points, which for irrigators can 
extend for many miles and can overlap with other water users, will be a likely source of 
conflict between farmers (e.g. the majority of potato growers rotate their equipment 
across different catchments and are likely to compete for the same stocks of water in the 
years when the areas of production coincide in the same catchment).11 
                                           
8 SEPA costs with the WFD, in 2006-2007, totalized £17.8 millions, split between £1.6 million in 
applications for new operator authorisations and £16.2 millions in authorisation subsistence fees 
(Scottish Executive, 2006). 
9 “Analysis of responses to the consultation paper on the proposed Water Environment (Transitional) 
Charging Scheme” and “Summary and Analysis of responses to the consultation on the proposed 
Water Environment (Controlled Activities) Fees and Charges Scheme 2006”, at 
www.sepa.org.uk/consultation/closed.htm (accessed on 30 October 2007). 
10 In an attempt to remove political resistance, SEPA had to amend the proposed calculation of bulk 
water charges, which added complexity to an already very unpopular charging scheme. For 
instance, the annual charge applied to water abstraction is determined by taking into account eight 
different factors: volume, return rate, river length affected, water source, seasonality, proportion of 
river flow, number of abstractions and a financial factor, cf. Water Environment (Controlled 
Activities) Fees and Charges (Scotland) Scheme, 2006. 
11 SEPA has promised that water scarce situations will be handled through ‘water management 
strategies’, which are a form of coordination amongst abstractors; however, it is not clear how 
situations of conflict will be sorted out, or how some water licences will be prioritized. 
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Table 1. Public complaints about the introduction of water charges. 
The farming sector in Scotland stated that "few issues have generated as much heat and 
discussion with SEPA and the Scottish Executive as the new charges for regulating farms that 
abstract water. The Union has continued to press for a clear explanation as to the public benefits 
of the charging scheme" (NFUS, 2006). 
[The President of the National Farmers Union, Scotland, argued that] "(…) our regulatory system 
has spun out of control as farms face a continual increase in red tape and massive associated 
charges. Yet there is little evidence or explanation of the reasons why or the benefits" (The 
Scotsman, 2006). 
"Overall the [Highland] Council’s concern is that the proposed charging scheme would have a 
significant and disproportionate effect on the Council’s capital and maintenance budgets, and also 
add significantly to the administrative burden on the Council" (Transport, Environmental and 
Community Services Committee, The Highland Council, 17 August 2006). 
"Because of the new complex Licence (licences issued by SEPA can either be simple or complex) 
rate the Scottish Executive has put in place within the Controlled Activities Regulations structure, 
hydro schemes in Scotland are facing licence application charges at the same rate whether they 
are 100 kW or 100 MW in size. (…) the WFD will create project uncertainty which could jeopardize 
securing finance. Because the WFD is reviewed every six years, scheme operators are concerned 
that new schemes that are viable and acceptable under the legislation will become uneconomic 
after subsequent review. (…) Given preparatory work by SEPA for implementing the legislation, 
we are far from sure that local and global environmental considerations are being correctly 
balanced" (Scottish Renewables Briefing, April 2006). 
"There will be some cost attached to water users. However, these costs must be seen in 
perspective. Scotland has an obligation to ensure adequate protection of all waters and their 
ecology. If the WFD provisions are implemented poorly, the costs to the society, industries and 
the environment will be great. The economic and environmental gains of properly implementing 
the Directive far outweigh the costs of its implementation" (Controlled Activities Regulations 
Proposals for Regulation, A Policy Statement from the LINK Freshwater Taskforce, May 2005). 
"Both the whisky industry and bottled water producers were anxious about the potential effects of 
the implementation of the WFD in Scotland. The SWA (Scottish Whisky Association) was 
concerned that increased costs following the introduction of the WFD could potentially threaten 
marginal distilleries. They were also concerned that the WFD was only one part of a wider set of 
controls, the cumulative impact of which may adversely affect the competitive position of whisky. 
(…) The British Soft Drinks Association (BSDA) was worried that any licencing regime for water 
abstraction might be the result of 'bureaucratic rather than environmental reasons’. (…) There is a 
view in the UK, rightly or wrongly, that this country responds with alacrity to the requirements of 
European directives and obeys the letter of the law, while other EU states are a little more self-
interested or piecemeal" (Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, House of Commons, November 
2001). 
Because of the fierce controversy around bulk water charges (which was probably 
inevitable, given that hitherto, water use was often a free right attached to land 
ownership; cf. Allan, 2003), the initial implementation of the WFD in Scotland has been 
primarily associated with the economic dimension of water, at the expense of other 
initiatives more directly related to the mitigation of environmental and social problems. 
Although the payment of charges for water use is obviously part of the new regulatory 
regime, to a large extent it has become an objective in itself, particularly because the 
activities of the environmental regulator depend on the successful collection of those 
charges. In conceptual terms, it means that environmental objectives attached to 
payments became increasingly subordinated to the financial sustainability of SEPA. This 
is even more serious considering that the entirety of the water charges is used to finance 
(half) of the regulatory costs of the agency to oversee the implementation of the WFD. 
Unlike the water charges of other countries, such as France, where the income is 
reinvested into the improvement of the water environment, the charging scheme in 
Scotland represents a significant deviation from the objectives of applying the polluter-
pays principle. At the same time as the new charges in Scotland not being directly 
related to investments in environmental restoration, they also have the negative 
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consequence of reducing the multiplicity of social and natural values of water to the 
single dimension of money value. 
Among the various user sectors, the public water industry is probably the one that 
reflects this gradual commoditisation of water most clearly. As mentioned above, in 2002, 
the consolidation in a single utility company (Scottish Water) was presented as the best 
operational alternative to avoid the persistent financial losses of the then three water 
companies. Continuous losses had then put the market value of the Scottish water 
industry at least £500 million less than its outstanding debt (WIC, 2007). Since the 
reorganisation, Scottish Water has recovered its regulatory capital value,12 after having 
invested £413 million and achieved cost savings of more than £1 billion (Scottish Water, 
2005, 2007). Not only is its management increasingly driven by an economic rationale, 
but the public image of Scottish Water has also been dominated by pressures to reduce 
costs and improve performance. Additional legislation, such as the Water Services 
Scotland Act 2005, required Scottish Water to establish a separate retail entity to 
compete on a level playing the field with other new entrants in the water services market 
(WIC, 2007). Under mounting pressure, the company moved beyond its solely 
governmental status and created a new commercial branch – Scottish Water Solutions – 
a joint venture between Scottish Water (51% of shares) and two consortiums of 
engineering and private water companies (24.5% of shares each). Scottish Water 
Solutions was required to deliver 2500 projects estimated at £2.3 billion with a budget of 
only £1.81 billion (in other words, deliver more with less money). However, these 
financial savings are not immune to criticism, especially considering that the selection of 
investment priorities is largely subject to political and commercial pressures. In effect, 
interventions have been concentrated in locations and catchments where there are 
higher commercial results for the companies that form Scottish Water Solutions or where 
the achievement of targets is relatively easier. The use of 'rational' analytical tools to 
select and justify positioned water management decisions is certainly not new (see 
Ingram, 1972), but the emphasis on this kind of approach has encouraged the 
subordination of the institutional water reforms to commercial targets and business 
strategies. 
Another aspect of the controversial exacerbation of the economic dimension of water is 
related to disputes about the costs of mitigating environmental impacts. The WFD is, by 
definition, a 'framework' type of legislation, which means that it systematizes the 
direction that European countries should follow, while details of the application are 
delegated to the national administrations. Within reasonable technical boundaries, 
member countries can interpret the requirements of the Directive in order to restore 
water bodies to 'good ecological status’. If the current condition deviates from a good 
status, a series of measures must be put in place to guarantee environmental restoration 
by 2015. To inform the achievement of 'good ecological status' in Scotland, a series of 
publications have tried to calculate the monetary value of environmental conservation 
and the cost of restoration (e.g. CJC Consulting, 2002; ENTEC, 2004; Hanley et al., 2006; 
Lago et al., 2006; MacLeod et al., 2006; Moran and Dann, 2008).13 Crucially, under the 
WFD the regulator can only impose mitigation measures that are ‘feasible’ and 
'proportionate'. The financial costs associated to environmental compliance can be 
avoided, or at least minimized, if the activity is considered eligible for ‘derogation’ (cf. 
Article 4 of the WFD; see European Commission, 2000). Activities that cause serious 
environmental impacts can lawfully continue to operate on grounds of disproportionate 
costs, public interest, or sustainable development goals (i.e. the criteria for derogation). 
                                           
12 Regulatory capital value is a measure of the value placed on the capital invested in the company 
(in other words, it is the market evaluation of the company, including assets and debts). 
13 These publications have in common the use of environmental economic methodologies (e.g. 
contingent valuation methods) that permeate the entire WFD regime and betray the influence of 
neoclassical economics over contemporary environmental policies. 
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At the same time as the mechanism of derogation, if not well used, can undermine the 
rigour of the new regulatory regime, it was sometimes manipulated by SEPA as an 
appeasement strategy to remove opposition to the translation of the WFD into Scottish 
legislation: in the early days of implementation of the WFD, some SEPA representatives 
tried to persuade antagonistic voices to accept the new regulation, provided that the 
really decisive phase would only come later, with the assessment of environmental risks 
and the appraisal of derogations (which would be managed by the agency anyway…). In 
many instances, SEPA is now politically and morally constrained to disregard some 
onerous mitigation options and should concentrate on a relatively small number of 'cost-
effective' (i.e. probably less stringent) alternatives. 
Arguments about the reasonableness of restoration costs continue to poison the dialogue 
between water stakeholders and the environmental regulator. In such situations of 
conflict, economic assessments are often used to protect established interests, such as 
the expansion of hydropower generation (incidentally, Moran et al., 2007, project an 
increase in freshwater use by 39% between 2001 and 2015, primarily driven by 
hydropower generation). A concrete example is the dispute about the 13 miles of the 
river Gary (central Scotland) that lies dry most of the year because water is held back by 
a hydroelectricity dam. Environmental economists compared the cost of power 
generation with the marginal benefit of increased revenues from fisheries and concluded 
that the 'social' costs of reducing electricity are disproportionately high in relation to the 
value of fish preservation (cf. Hanley and Black, 2006). The local fisheries board 
obviously disagrees and continues to claim that the river Gary is "Scotland's most abused 
river" and that the "electricity produced by the Tummel-Garry (hydropower) scheme was 
intended for sale to the towns and cities in lowland Scotland as opposed to Highland 
communities".14 This is in sheer contrast with the position of the hydropower company 
manager, who in a television programme made extensive use of the utilitarian expression 
"balancing water needs between the environmental and the generation of renewable 
energy" as an (economic) excuse for the maintenance of hydropower operation in the 
area (Landward, BBC2, 23 November 2007).15 
DISCUSSION: THE INHERENT LIMITS OF THE WATER REFORMS 
The above paragraphs identified some fundamental shortcomings of the experience with 
the WFD in Scotland in the period 2002-2008. While the analysis concentrated on the 
limitations of the new regulation, it must be acknowledged that the reform of the legal 
framework has been significant in itself (i.e. the shift from court-based decisions to 
administrative decisions regarding disputed water rights), in the sense that hitherto only 
a largely unfettered common law regime (with some exceptions) existed in Scotland, with 
very little constraints under the law. It should also be mentioned that the Scottish 
experience also comprises a number of cases where the interaction between private 
stakeholders and the public sector was more balanced and transparent than the average 
(such as the support to the development of catchment plans of the Dee and Tweed rivers, 
and the attempt to discuss the new regulation with irrigators in some small catchments 
along the east coast in 2004 and 2005). These isolated initiatives were, however, 
exceptions. On the whole, it seems that an outstanding opportunity to promote a new 
paradigm of water regulation is being largely missed. Instead of implementing the WFD 
                                           
14 Tay District Salmon Fisheries Board, at www.tdsfb.org (accessed on 03 December 2007). 
15 In 2007, SEPA began to recognize the political and methodological difficulties of quantifying the 
monetary value of the water environment more formally. The recent discussions in the Area 
Advisory Groups indicate that SEPA is now moving its language away from costs and benefits to 
more qualitative ‘options appraisal’. The Agency has been forced to acknowledge that around one 
third of water bodies may not achieve good status by 2015 with existing measures and those that 
might easily be implemented (ENDS Report, 2007). 
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through innovative forms of dialogue and cooperation, as claimed in numerous policy 
documents, the new water regulation has followed the conventional top-down model of 
environmental management that prevails in most countries. Since its early days, different 
authors indicated the existence of serious obstacles for the success of the WFD in 
Scotland (e.g. lack of regulatory authority and enforcement resources; cf. Warren, 2002); 
only a few years later, it is already possible to identify a broadening gap between the 
ambitious rhetoric and the narrow reality of the new water regulation. In effect, several 
stakeholders contacted during this research (particularly those involved in the 
preparation of the River Basin Management Plans) have voiced their increasing 
frustration with the repetition of old practices and mistakes of previous environmental 
regulations. 
At face value, the range of events, reports, consultations and media coverage concerning 
implementation of the WFD in Scotland may give the impression of an ample reform. It 
seems that long-term management problems, such as degraded river stretches, 
obstruction of rivers by large dams, low river flow during dry summers, and declining fish 
population, will be finally resolved; or that the government is employing economic 
incentives, including fees and taxes, to manage water systems according to broader 
public priorities that are widely discussed with the population. However, a more careful 
analysis reveals the superficial level of change and the overambitious rhetoric of the WFD. 
It becomes clear that the actual methods of assessing problems and formulating 
solutions have mostly reproduced the patchy responses that existed before the WFD. 
What is more, the timid scope of the ongoing water reforms in Scotland has eroded the 
prospects of effectively improving the use and conservation of water. For instance, 
despite all the controversy around the new charging scheme, it basically aims to recover 
the operational costs of SEPA rather than the internalisation of the social costs of water 
use: to many who took part in the public consultations and protested in the media, the 
WFD regime has been focused on imposing fees and taxes too much rather than on 
environmental conservation. 
The growing frustration of water stakeholders with the WFD in Scotland certainly echoes 
the contested nature of the international experience with environmental governance. 
What is peculiar to the Scottish experience, though, is the fact that, because of the 
reconfiguration of Scottish public affairs, public involvement and economic-based 
regulation have evolved through the unique circumstances created by Devolution. The 
reform of water institutions in Scotland provided an invaluable opportunity to understand 
the connections between territorial politics, environmental vulnerability, and economic 
pressures. The WFD is a legal requirement of the European Union that has been 
opportunistically transformed into a compelling argument in favour of the benefits of the 
self-government of Scotland. Nonetheless, regionalist pressures, such as Devolution, are 
part of a new scale of state power that mostly aims at rescaling, instead of resolving, 
economic deficits (Jones, 2001). In the case of the WFD, the political construction of 
Devolution has triggered an asymmetric territorialisation of water policies within Scotland 
and between different parts of the United Kingdom, and has also exacerbated the 
economic dimension of water use. While most user sectors (agriculture is the exception) 
are likely to increase their use of water significantly during the implementation of the 
WFD (cf. Moran et al. 2007), the new regulation has been incapable of dealing with the 
close relationship between poor water quality and social deprivation in other marginalized 
areas, such as the suburbs of Glasgow (Fairburn et al., 2005; see also Lucas et al., 
2004). 16 The hidden disputes and unfulfilled promises of the new water regime also 
                                           
16 According to Fairburn et al. (2005: 121), there are more deprived social groups living within a 
shorter distance of poor quality rivers (classes C and D, the worst situations) than wealthier 
groups, which indicates an obvious problem of environmental injustice in Scotland. It should be 
noted that social “poverty in Scotland relates both to post-industrialism in rural and urban areas 
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reflect the fact that the large water users and the environmental regulator are writing the 
story lines of water reforms in Scotland (see Hendry, 2006). At the same time, the 
independence of the regulator is constantly challenged by the pressure exerted by 
political party leaders, private consultants and, more importantly, the representation of 
the stronger user sectors. 
The reliance on the generic assessment of ecological processes and the quick-fix solution 
to long-term environmental impacts betrays the technocratic basis of the new water 
institutions. As pointed out by Frodeman (2006), a large part of current environmental 
policies embody positivist and procedural biases "in that it seeks to rationalize and make 
more efficient the expression of our values, while abstaining from the project of making 
these values themselves more reasonable". Because of its technocratic heritage, the key 
outcomes of the WFD experience have been an artificial (and mostly unnecessary) 
complexification of water management and the widespread use of the money language: 
the dominant forms of dealing with water remain bounded by economic assumptions 
about how nature operates and how natural resources should be used. The 'cash nexus' 
(cf. Foster, 2002) inevitably results in the exacerbation of the economic dimension of 
managed water systems, at the expense of other social and cultural characteristics, 
despite the fact that there is no empirical evidence that monetisation improves 
environmental management (Burkett, 2003). On the whole, the failure to articulate 
alternatives has left water reforms in Scotland exposed to the neoliberalisation of public 
policies that ultimately constitutes the fabric of contemporary approaches to 
environmental problems (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). Because of the powerful 
influence of neoliberalism, the new regulatory regime may be capable of acknowledging 
complexity and sectoral difference, but it is reticent when it comes to allocating 
responsibilities for environmental impacts. The standard assessment of environmental 
impacts effectively dilutes the responsibility for the genuinely serious damages, inasmuch 
as it basically deals with the most common impacts and only resorts to a limited range of 
mitigation responses. Such a conclusion should not come as a surprise, since it is a 
characteristic of neoclassical economics, strongly related to the WFD experience, to say 
little about the evaluation of past mistakes in relation to the environment (Söderbaum, 
2000). 
Overall, the two strongest institutions advanced by the WFD, namely 'the search for 
economic efficiency' and 'the involvement of the public’, have not produced fundamental 
changes in the forms of using and conserving water in Scotland (albeit that it may be 
seen as better than the pre-existing largely unregulated nature of abstraction of water 
under the common law). Although some localized and patchy improvements are expected 
as a result of the WFD, the introduction of an economic-based regulation will continue to 
raise conflicts and contradictions (as in the case about deciding derogations). This is due 
to both the WFD being entangled in multileveled disputes and, more importantly, the 
WFD being in itself a very limited piece of regulation that, despite its formal requirements, 
has perpetuated an uneven and centralized management of water use and conservation 
(Allan (2003) notes that "for all practical purposes, the use of water in Scotland is 
centrally controlled"). It is wise to remember the observations by Ost (1997) about the 
conventional development of new environmental regulation: the formulation of an 
extensive mechanism of control and enforcement produces little more than a 
bureaucratic, ineffective apparatus that looks like a 'state-show' (i.e. a state that 
fruitlessly attempts to satisfy conflicting interests). The whole process can be compared 
to a 'tapestry of Penelope’: what is produced during the day is undone during the night… 
The shortcomings of the water regulation reform in Scotland indicate a pressing need for 
deeper changes in the use and conservation of water systems, which should be strongly 
                                                                                                                                    
and also the pre-industrial history of the concentration of power in rural areas with their unequal 
distribution of land ownership” (Todd and Zografos, 2005). 
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grounded on principles of environmental justice and positioned beyond standardized 
solutions to water management problems. First and foremost, it is important to accept 
that the political dimension of the WFD reforms and the contested basis of water policy-
making are permanent elements of water management institutions (i.e. water scarcity, 
pollution and flooding events unevenly affect different groups and spatial areas, which in 
turn have differentiated possibilities to react and influence policy-making). Because of 
the intrinsic politicisation of water management, effective answers to old and new 
problems depend on more inclusive decision-making and a schedule of discussions and 
negotiation more realistic than the rigid and predetermined timetable of the WFD. By the 
same token, public policies should avoid positivistic or technocratic approaches to water 
management problems and recognize the full extent of the complex relationship between 
nature and society. In particular, it will be necessary to have a more open debate about 
the limits of scientific assessments and the inevitable uncertainties that underpin 
technical statements. It is important that scientists also include the social causes of 
environmental degradation in their 'models and assessments’, especially the long legacy 
of past interventions such as hydropower and water storage dams. Finally, it is not 
possible to think about institutional reforms divorced from broader issues of commodity 
production and consumption, but water management demands need to be coherently 
integrated into regional planning and national socio-economic policies. On the whole, a 
truly sustainable management of water cannot be reconciled with a centralized and 
narrow institutional solution to water problems, such as has been the case with the 
Water Framework Directive thus far. Unlike in the pay of Pirandello (1984), the 
characters still have to invade the stage and insist on being given life and being allowed 
to tell their own story. 
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